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Abstract
This paper describes the justification for a project to assess the security status of wireless networks usage in
Nuku’alofa, the CBD of Tonga, By War Driving these suburbs, actual data was gathered to indicate the security
status of wireless networks and provide an understanding of the users’ level of awareness and attitudes towards
wireless security. This paper also takes the opportunity to compare the performance of the War driving tools that
this study employed – GMoN, SWardriving, and Wi-Fi Scan. Wireless network communication remains a
challenging and critical issue. This study takes an exploratory approach in which it allows the researcher to explore
and dig deeper in to the data to find out the true status of wireless network security in Tonga. Not only that, it also
allows the researcher to compare the performance of the tools based on the data. The results are very interesting,
they indicate that, since the introduction of the fibre optic network, the usage of wireless communication technology
grows as well. However, it is evident that wireless network security is still in its early stages. WEP encryption
method is still in use, 24.2% with no encryption, and 9.2% did not change their SSID. In terms of tools’
performances, it is evident in this study that the SWardriving tool outperforms the GMoN and the Wi-Fi Scan tools
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INTRODUCTION
The growth of the communication technologies has changed the way we live and conduct our day to day tasks.
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is one of the most vital traits of every new development
(Alshehri & Drew, 2010, p.35). This trend of technological advancements has reached the Kingdom of Tonga. In
2010, Tonga Communications Corporation (TCC) – the country’s leading provider of complete end-to-end
telephony and Internet services – launched the new mobile-broadband-enabled GSM to replace the previous
macro-GSM network (Grealish, 2010, P.1). On the 21st August 2013, the first submarine cable (fibre optic) that
connects Tonga to the outside world went live (Matangi Tonga, 2013, P.1).
The Kingdom of Tonga is one of the developing countries in the South Pacific with a population of just over 107
thousand. In 2009, the Government of Tonga has identified Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
as an engine for growth in a national ICT vision and strategy. This focuses on Education, Health, Environment
Sustainability, and the Growth of the Industry. The National ICT policy for Tonga consists of six main components
- Provision of ICT in Homes and Communities, Education and Skill Development, E‐ Government, Industry
Growth and Economic Development, An enabling technical infrastructure and the ICT related legislation (Ma'u,
2015, p.1). The rapid growth of ICT technologies in Tonga is evident in the literature. In 2010, the Tonga
Communications Corporation (TCC) – the country’s leading provider of complete end-to-end telephony and
Internet services – launched the new mobile-broadband-enabled GSM to replace the previous macro-GSM
network. Before the introduction of the fibre optic cable, only 20% across the country uses Internet. At the time
of writing this paper, over 75% of the country subscribes for an Internet connection. There are only two Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) in Tonga - Tonga Communications Corporation (TCC) and Digicel.
TCC provides hosting and both Wireless and Fixed broadband access while Digicel only provides Wireless access.
Jensen and Minges (2017) explained that, the Danden Group provides Internet access via satellite (VSAT) (p.140).
Several wireless technologies (WiMAX and 3G) are offered, and TCC provides fixed broadband using ADSL2+
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in some areas. An 827km submarine cable connecting Tonga to Fiji was commissioned in August 2013. From Fiji,
onward connectivity is provided via the Southern Cross cable to Australia and the United States. The new cable
provides an initial capacity of 10 Gbps (ADB, 2018, p.3). Therefore, more places are now available with open
wireless hotspot such as pizzerias, hotels, cafes, pubs, and restaurants.

PREVIOUS LITERATURE
Recently, the advancement in the wireless communication technologies, and reduction of cost have allowed for
multi-hop wireless networks mainly for monitoring. For instance, wireless technologies such as such as sensors
for measurements of plant variables can be transmitted to data centres wirelessly (Zheng et al., 2017, p.139). The
802.11 standards are a group of evolving specifications defined by the institute of electrical and electronic
engineers (IEEE). Commonly referred to as Wi-Fi the 802.11 standards define a through-the-air interface between
a wireless client and a base station access point or between two or more wireless client. There are many other
standards defined by the IEE, such as the 802.3 Ethernet standards (Nisbet, 2012, p.1168).
Table 1: Various wireless standards
Standard

Release
Date

Frequency

Maximum
Rate

Physical Layer
Technology

Technology

802.11

1997

2.4GHz

1 & 2Mbps

DSSS

N/A

FHSS, IR
802.11b

1999

2.4GHz

11Mbps

DSSS

N/A

802.11a

1999

5GHz

6 to 54Mbps

OFDM

N/A

802.11g

2003

2.4GHz

54Mbps

DSSS, OFDM

N/A

802.11n

2009

2.4GHz

600Mbps

OFDM

MIMO:4 SPATIAL STREAMS

802.11ac

2014

5GHz

1.3Gbps

OFDM

MIMO, MU-MIMO:8 spatial
streams

From among various wireless LAN standards, 802.11ac is more recent, a faster and more scalable version of
802.11n. It operates in the 5-GHz waveband and provides eight channels of 866.7Mbps each with a maximum
range of 150 meters or 450 feet. It is backward compatible with 802.11b, 802.11a, 802.11g and 802.11ac products
(Bejarano, Knightly & Park, 2013, p.85). The table below provides a brief overview of the currently used IEEE
WLAN standards (Sidhu, Singh & Chhabra, 2007, p.45).
Today, Tongan society is networked, ranging from people to objects. Day to day life’s so dependent on technology
in order to communicate with each other. However, systems that enable us to conduct our day to day tasks are
required to be networked (Pesch & Timm-Giel, 2008). As the popularity of wireless applications grew rapidly,
wireless network professionals were faced with problems of protecting the privacy and confidentiality of its users.
Now, managing wireless LANs should integrate seamlessly into existing enterprise network design and network
management principles. At the moment, the technologies for supporting such integration are not highly developed
(Vassis et al., 2005, p.21). Security measures were built into the wireless network standards, IEEE 802.11 - for
instance, Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol (WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). Yet, it is now accepted
worldwide that wireless networks are more vulnerable than the traditional wired. Some of the problems are due to
the fact that the network is wireless, and also based on the type of wireless communication technique supported by
802.11, and also some vulnerabilities are protocol based.
Although there has been tremendous growth and performance success, everything relative to 802.11 WLANs has
not been positive. There have been numerous published reports and papers describing attacks on 802.11 wireless
networks that exposed organizations to security risks. This subsection will briefly cover the risks to security—i.e.,
attacks on confidentiality, integrity, and network availability.
Threats to Wireless LAN
Wireless networks are not very expensive to implement and maintain. However, security has hindered network
managers in the field from employing the technology (Vacca, 2006, p.4). Encryption was the technology designed
to deal with the threat of sniffing, this was included in the development of the Wireless Application Protocol
(WAP) released with the Wireless LAN 802.1 lb standard (Gohring, 2005, p.1). Wireless Networks enables
anytime and anywhere access for its users. Sniffing is an inherent problem in wireless. Sniffers must have access
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to physical parts of the network in order to break in the wired world. However, it is not like that with the Wireless
technology, they do not even have to be in the network. Sniffers can be sniffing from a vehicle outside (Xiushuang,
Zhankao & Dengke, 2006, p.1390).
Improper installation and configuration of a Wireless LAN devices is one of the main contributors to the problems.
For instance:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

Not hiding the SSID/ESSID
Using a very easy to identify network name
Lack of control over a connection area (range may be too large)
Access Points are not password protected.
Failing to apply security controls.

As mentioned earlier, an attack on traditional wired network, the attacker has to be in the perimeter. As for the
wireless network, the attacker needs only to be within range of a wireless device. The security requirements for
WLANs can be divided into primary goals and secondary goals. Primary goals include Confidentiality, Integrity,
Authentication, and Availability. Secondary goals include data freshness, self-organisation or distributed
collaboration (Harvey, 2014, p.19). Typical attacks against wired and wireless networks can be divided into
passive and active attacks. Passive attacks include monitoring of network traffic and wireless communication
channels for information that can be used to execute active attacks (Kisner et al., 2010, p.15). Some of the wellknown threats to wireless as listed:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)

Rouge access points
DoS/DDoS attacks
Attacks on cryptographic safeguards
Disrupting the client-access point connection (which is considered preparatory for further attacks)
Man-in-the-Middle attack.
Table 2: Cybersecurity attack-vulnerability-damage model (Kisner et al., 2010, p.16).
Attack

Vulnerability

Origin

Action

Target

Local

Probe

Network

Configuration

Remote

Scan

Process

Flood

System

Authenticate

Data

Bypass

User

Damage
State effect

Severity

None

Performance
effect
None

Specification

Availability

Timeliness

Low

Implementation

Integrity

Precision

Medium

Confidentiality

Accuracy

High

None

Spoof
Eavesdrop
Misdirect
Read/copy
Terminate
Execute
Modify
Delete

Wi-Fi networks are easy to be detected, identified and analysed. There are off the shelf or free download wireless
analysis tools available that can be used to do the following:
a)
b)
c)
d)

Analysis of packet headers
SSIDs are visible
MAC addresses can be seen
Encryption method can be revealed
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e) Signal range/strength can be determined
f) Wi-Fi device vendor’s information can be extracted
g) IP addresses can be obtained
Organisations (ISO TMB Working Group, 2008, p.4) in the public and private sectors depend on Information
Technology (ISO/IEC, 2005, p.1). Information Systems these days are very complicated (Ross et al., 2008, p.1)
and to successfully carry out their missions and business requirements they have to employ IT. An Information
Systems can include an office networks, financial and personnel systems to a very specialized system ranging from
an industrial control systems, weapons systems, telecommunications systems, and environmental control systems.
As a result, Information systems can attract serious threats that will have an impact on the organisation’s operations
and assets, individuals by exploiting both known and unknown vulnerabilities to compromise the Confidentiality,
Integrity, or Availability of the information either in process, stored, or even in transmission. Threats to
information systems can include targeted attacks, natural disaster, human errors, and structural failures (Blank &
Gallagher, 2012, p.1).
Table 3: Layer based categorisation of possible attacks on identified assets
Assets

Possible attacks

Layers

Availability

Signal jamming Intentional collision of frames,

Physical data-link network

virtual jamming UDP flood, ICMP flood DoS

transport

attacks, DDoS DNS spoofing, TCP SYN flood,
de-synchronization
Data integrity

Mac spoofing session hijacking

Data-link transport

Confidentiality

Replay attack, eavesdropping and man-in-the-

Data-link

middle, mac spoofing, pre-computation and
partial matching
Software

Worms and viruses

Application

Hardware

Device tampering and physical damage

Physical

It is evident in the literature that the best possible way to identify potential threats to an Information System is to
first identify possible attacks based on network assets. Threats/attacks aim towards one or more assets (Myagmar,
Lee & Yurcik, 2005, p.3). Table 3 identified known attacks on each identified information assets (Glass, Portmann
& Muthukkumarasamy, 2008, p.31) and the attacks are categorised by layer. The layer-wise categorisation of
threats on assets help Information System Security Experts in identifying suitable security controls.
As the popularity of wireless applications grew rapidly, wireless network professionals are faced with problems
of protecting the privacy and confidentiality of its users. Now, managing wireless LANs should integrate
seamlessly into existing enterprise network design and network management principles. At the moment, the
technologies for supporting such integration are not highly developed (Reiher et al., 2007, p.7). Security measures
were built into the wireless network standards, IEEE 802.11 - for instance, Wired Equivalent Privacy protocol
(WEP) and Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA). Yet, it is now accepted worldwide that wireless networks are more
vulnerable than the traditional wired. Some of the problems are due to the fact that the network is wireless, and
also based on the type of wireless communication technique supported by 802.11, and also some vulnerabilities
are protocol based.
Although there has been tremendous growth and performance success, everything relative to 802.11 WLANs has
not been positive. There have been numerous published reports and papers describing attacks on 802.11 wireless
networks that exposed organizations to security risks. This subsection will briefly cover the risks to security—i.e.,
attacks on confidentiality, integrity, and network availability. Known weaknesses of the cryptographic protocols
and algorithms have been used to work out tools which enable carrying out the attack. The popular tools are as
follows: AirSnort, which enables recovery of the WEP key on the basis of an analysis of the sufficient number of
the intercepted packets (e.g. by means of the FMS method – which name derives from the surnames of its authors:

Proceedings of the 16th Australian Information Security Management Conference (2018)

54

Fluhrer, Mantin, and Shamir), Aircrack (which uses a dictionary attack on WPA but is not limited to it), and
WepLab, which uses optimized FMS and Korek’s attacks. The Wigle.net site has worked out the list of 1000 most
popular WLAN network names in the world, and it was used by the makers of tools for cracking safeguards as the
base for creation of special tables (rainbow tables), which facilitated the practice.

FINDINGS & DISCUSSIONS
A systematic guidance of a methodology is highly recommended to maintain the integrity of the findings.
Exploratory research is employed in this study as it allows the researcher to gain a deeper understanding of an
issue or problem (ISO/IEC, 2004, p.7). Benbasat, Goldstein and Mead (1987) rightly pointed out that, it is an
exploratory paper that reveals an important factor in the implementation process. This exploratory study will
conclude with suggestions to which opensource tool that it is suitable for such an environment. The design of the
study aims to first identify the problem and the motivation of the study based on the literature analysis. When the
problem identification is completed then the second task is to define the problem and extract its significance. This
involves analysing the existing literature in the body of knowledge; identify the problem, and consulting experts
in the field.
The third stage of the study is designed to deal with designing and formulating the main research question and the
development of the research design. The fourth stage deals with identifying the best route for the war-drive. This
is the first time for a study like this to be conducted in Tonga. As a result, in order to identify the true status of
WLAN security implementation in the CBD of Tonga, the war-drive needs to capture both enterprise and personal
WLAN data. This philosophy needs to be the main factor in determining the route for the war-drive in this phase.
Once the route is determined, then the data collection process will start according as shown in Figure 1.
Once the data collection is finished then the data analysis will begin in phase five. The data analysis phase is
designed to identify the true status of WLAN security in the CBD, Nuku’alofa. That is, conduct vendors’ analysis,
SSID configuration analysis, encryption methods analysis, and so on. The final phase of the study is designed to
allow the researcher(s) to employ various scholarly electronic databases to communicate the outcome of the study.

Figure 1: War-Driving route in Nuku’alofa
WLAN is easier to exploit than traditional wired networks. Some people use war-driving to demonstrate how easy
it is to compromise or penetrate WLANs (Harley, 2008, p.221). The war driver can easily map the locations of the
wireless nodes. To start collecting data, tools for war-drive such as hardware and software need to be considered.
Employing of well-known tools such as a laptop with good wireless card and a Wi-Fi signal booster, GPS unit,
magnetically mount external antenna for the top of the vehicle and amplifier is recommended. Scanning software
such as Kismet, Network Stumbler (NetStumbler), Airbase, and AirCrack however, it is quite hard to find in
Tonga. The following sub-sections is designed to introduce the tools employed and discuss the findings.
War-Driving Tools
This study employed three different open-source war-driving tools namely SWardriving, GMoN, and Wi-Fi Scan.
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SWardriving, a simple application used for Wardriving anywhere in the world, is a powerful scanner for
Wardriving. GPS and Wireless Wi-Fi network scanner collaborates to locate access points Wi-Fi in this application
of SWardriving. Then the essential data is saved in a database where it can be exported to a KML, CSV, or
GEOJSON and sqlite. It is important to wait for the device to determine the current location through GPS to
acquire the necessary data Wireless Wi-Fi network. A file may be created with the information provided from
using the SWardriving application. This file is called a Keyhole Markup Language (KML) file, created and opened
with Google Earth to pin point the data using map mode. When the Google Earth is opened, the position of the
Wi-Fi network will appear as coloured dots. By clicking on each dot, more information is displayed such as signal
strength, quality and type of network. Comma Separated Values (CSV) which displays the GPS-Tagging and
statistics of the captured WLANs can also be transmitted using SWardriving. For encryption purposes,
SWardriving has five different display results such as WEP, WPA, WpaPsk, WPA2, Open and not defined.
The analysis in this study covers the various features of WLAN usage in Nuku’alofa, the capital city of the Tonga
Islands. This study also considers well known AP vendors, nature of SSID settings used, WLAN standards used,
location, channels and encryption systems used, as well as deployment of network types. SWardriving does not
support MAC filtering, therefore MAC filtering was not included in the analyses of the identified 505 Wireless
nodes in this study.
Table 4: War-Driving tools and their key features
G-MoN

Wi-FiScan

SWardriving

Key Features:

Key Features

Key Features

o Shows every WLAN that’s in
range
o CSV EXPORT RUN
o KML EXPORT RUN
o CSV EXPORT DB
o KML EXPORT DB
o BACKUP DATABASE
o Statistics about your found
WLANs
o Show your position and APs
in Map-Mode
Views of different encryption
modes:
o WPA2
o WPA
o WEP
o [ESS]
o [IBSS]

o

Menu-Buttons:
o Uses GPS to estimate
locations of observed
networks
o Observations logged to local
database to track your
networks found
o Upload and compete on the
global WiGLE.net
leaderboard
o Real-time map of networks
found, with overlays from
entire WiGLE dataset
o Free, open source, no ads
(pull requests welcome at
https://github.com/wiglenet/w
igle-wifi-wardriving )

Key Features
o Export KML files in
the SD (for
importing into
Google Maps/Earth,
Wigle.net, ...)
o Export CSV files in
the SD (separated by
commas to Excel,
OpenOffice/LibreOff
ice, ...)
o Export GEOJSON
files in the SD
(separated by
commas.
o X: Delete ALL data
collected.
o STOP: STOP
Scanning

o
o
o
o

o
o

Shows every WLAN tht‘s in range
CSV-Export
KML-Export
GPS-Tagging of the found WLANs
Statistics about your found WLANs
Show your position and APs in MapMode

Views of different encryption modes:
o
o
o
o
o

# WPA2
+ WPA
- WEP
" " Open
? not defined

Menu-Buttons:
o KML-Export: Exports your results
as
gmon_wlan_YYYY_MM_DD.kml
to the SD-Card. This file you can
import in Maps or Google Earth.
o Daily Export: Exports your daily
scanresults to
gmon_wlan_export_YYYY_MM_
DD.txt. This file is comma
separated so you can create your
own Statistic-Database
o Day & Night: Toggle the Day &
Night Modus. High contrast and
low contrast.
o Map: Shows your Position on a
Googlemap and APs in your
environment
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o
o

Shows every
WLAN that’s in
range
wifiscan-export.csv
wifiscanexport.kml
wifiscan-kistmetexport.csv

Key Features
o
o
o
o
o

WPA2
WPA
WEP
[ESS]
[IBSS]
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o
o
o

Stop Scanning & Exit: Exits GMon and stops the
backgroundprocess
About: About-Information
Help: Help

o Export to CSV files on SD
card (comma separated
values)
o Export to KML files on SD
card (to import into Google
Maps/Earth)
o Bluetooth GPS support
through mock locations

o START: Start
Scanning.

Audio and Text-to-Speech
alerting and "Mute" option to
shut off all sound/speech

When looking at the above table, the three tools detected similar number of devices that uses WEB, WPA, and
WPA2 encryption, Unlike Open and Unknown Encryption which they have a big different between them with
their number of devices.









G-MoN tool detect 83 devices while Wi-Fi Scan detect 113 devices and SWardriving identify up to 121
devices were configured open.
It was identified that 38 devices were marked as unknown with G-MoN tool because it cannot identify
the encryption methods used while the other two tools did not pick up any device with Unknown
encryption.
Table 5: Encryption methods comparison in %
Encryption

GMoN %

SWardriving %

Wi-Fi Scan %

Open

16.6

24.2

22.6

WEP

1

1

1.2

WPA

39.2

39

39

WPA2

36.6

36.6

37

Unknown

7.6

0

0

Table 5 shows that there are 39% of wireless devices in the Kingdom that still use WPA Encryption technique.
Even though WPA improved security of WEP Encryption, but is now also considered vulnerable to intrusion.
Over 36% of wireless devices in Nuku’alofa use WPA2, even though it is not perfect, but currently the most
secured choice.
16.6% of the devices were found by the GMoN tool to be Open meaning, no encryptions were used. At the
same time, the Wi-Fi Scan identified 22.6% while the SWardriving tool identified 24.2% of the detected
devices to be online with no encryption methods employed.
7.6% of the devices were marked with Unknown encryption by the GMoN tool meaning, the tool cannot
identify the encryption technique used. The SWardriving and the Wi-Fi Scan tool detected 0%.
Both the GMoN and the SWardriving identified 1% and the Wi-Fi Scan tool identified 1.2% of the detected
devices that still uses WEP encryption method.

Based on the analysis results shown in Table 5, the results for all the three chosen tools showed some very
interesting numbers. The SWardriving tools managed to identified 7.6% more devices than the GMoN tool, and
1.6% more than the Wi-Fi Scan tool that did not used any encryption method. All three tools basically detected
and yielded very similar numbers when talking about the three commonly used encryption methods. Based on the
results shown in Table 5, only the GMoN tool that was not able to detect the encryption status of 7.6% devices.
Following in Table 6, the results from the analysis of the devices’ SSID from the three chosen tools.
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Table 6: SSID analysis comparison
SSID



GMoN %

SWardriving %

Wi-Fi Scan %

Change

88.4

84

83.2

Default

9.2

8.6

9.2

Unknown

0.2

4.4

5.8

Other Devices

3.4

4.2

3

It is quite interesting to see that the GMoN tool identified 88.4% of the detected devices that their SSIDs have
been changed from the default. The SWardriving tool identified 84% while the Wi-Fi Scan tool only identified
83.2%.
The GMoN and the Wi-Fi Scan tools both identified 9.2% of the detected wireless devices that still used the
default SSIDs that came with either from the ISPs or the Vendors.
The Wi-Fi Scan tool was having difficulty identifying the status of 5.8% of the devices while the SWardriving
tool stuck with 4.4% of the devices and the GMoN tool only struggles with 0.2% of the devices detected.
One of the interesting results showed in Table 6 is that all of the tools employed in this study detected and
identified some devices that were not a wireless hotspot however in fact, they were identified as wireless
printers. The SWardriving tools identified the most at 4.2% while the GMoN tool identified 3.4% and 3% by
the Wi-Fi Scan tool.





Vendors' Analysis Results Comparison
140

Number of Devices

120
100
80

Gmon

Swardriving

Wi-Fi Scan

60
40

0

HUAWEI
TP-LINK
ASKEY COMPUTER
ASUSTek
AzureWave
Belkin
Cambium
Cisco
CradlePoint
Digital Data Communications
D-Link
Edimax
Epigram
Floware Wireless
Fortinet
GUANGDONG OPPO…
Hewlett Packard
Hon Hai
HONGKONG YUNLINK
KZ Broadband
Micronet
MitraStar
NETCOMM
NETGEAR
No Vendor
Routerboard
Ruckus Wireless
Samsung Electronics
Sony Mobile
Sophos Ltd
Synology
Tenda Technology
Ubiquiti Networks
WESTERN DIGITAL
Xiaomi Communications
zte corporation
Zyxel Communications

20

Vendors

Figure 2: Vendors’ analysis results comparison
36 vendors were identified out of the total of 500 wireless nodes detected in this war-drive study. Figure 2
illustrates the total results of the vendor’s analysis whereas Table 7 shows a summary of the most popular vendors
in the market today. As it illustrated in Figure 2, TP-Link seems to be the most used wireless device in Tonga at
25.2% as identified by the GMoN tool. Both SWardriving and Wi-Fi Scan identified 23.8% used TP-Link. The
second most used device in Tonga is the Huawei devices at 23% identified by the SWardriving tool while the
GMoN tool identified 21.2% and the Wi-Fi Scan identified 21% used Huawei devices.
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Table 7: Vendors’ analysis results comparison
Vendors

GMoN

SWardriving

Wi-Fi Scan

HUAWEI

21.2%

23%

21%

TP-LINK

25.2%

23.8%

23.8%

Cisco

1.2%

1.2%

1.2%

D-Link

0.8%

0.8%

1.6%

NETGEAR

1.2%

1.2%

1.2%

Ruckus Wireless

11%

11%

10%

Tenda Technology

1.8%

1.8%

1.8%

Ubiquiti Networks

3%

2.4%

3%

Xiaomi Communications

0.2%

0.2%

0.2%

ZTE Corporation

0.2%

0.2%

0.2%

Zyxel Communications

0.4%

0.4%

0.4%

No Vendor

20%

20.6%

18.6%

According to Table 7, a well-known vendor in the world market today such as Cisco and Netgear, all tools only
identified that only 1.2% of Tonga used devices from these two well-known vendors. D-Link came up at 0.8%
according to GMoN and SWardriving while Wi-Fi Scan tool identified 1.6%. It is also evident in this study the
growth in the usages of devices from vendors such as Ruckus Wireless. Both the GMoN and the SWardriving
tools identified 11% while the Wi-Fi Scan tools showed 10% in terms of the usages of devices from the Ruckus
Wireless. All tools identified a 1.8% of the devices were from the Tenda Technology while 0.2% were from the
Xiaomi Communications. 0.2% were identified came from the popular ZTE Corporation and 0.4% from the Zyxel
Communications.
The last row in Table 7 showed that SWardriving identified 20.6% as no vendor, 20% identified by GMoN and
18.6% identified by Wi-Fi Scan. The process employed by this study to identify the vendors of the detected devices
was by taking their MAC addresses and put it through https://macvendors.com/. The first three bytes of the MAC
address is taken and the vendor’s information is extracted. This means that the macvendors.com website cannot
extract the vendor’s information from the MAC address.

CONCLUSION
This paper conducted a study to analyse the status WLAN deployment growth and its security status in Nuku’alofa.
At the same time, evaluate the performance of the three tools employed in this study. As a result, this study
concluded that the status of wireless network growth increased considerably over the past five years since the
deployment of the fibre optic network. It is also evident in the study that WLAN security is still in its early stages.
WEP encryption method is still in use, 9.2% were detected by both the GMoN and the Wi-Fi Scan tools that they
did not change their SSID. 88.4% of the devices were identified by the GMoN tool that their SSID were changed.
However, 5.8% were identified by the Wi-Fi Scan tool as unknown meaning the tool cannot extract information
regarding its SSID. In terms the encryption methods, the SWardriving tool identified 24.2% left their encryption
not configured, 39% have their encryption configured to use the WPA method and 36.6% to use the WPA2 method.
In terms of tools’ performances, it is evident in this study that the SWardriving tool performs the best. The
SWardriving tool has demonstrated consistency, yielding data that can be trusted to base well informed decision
on. This study should be repeated after two years to get a better view of the status of WLAN security in the CBD
of Tonga, there is still a lot of room for improvements.
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